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1Washington University
Journal of Law & Policy
Evolving Voices in Land Use Law:
A Festschrift in honor of Daniel R. Mandelker
Part I: Historical Background
Chapter 1: The Supreme Court
Prelude to Euclid: The United States Supreme Court
and the Constitutionality of Land Use Regulation,
1900-1920
Joseph Gordon Hylton*
Historical accounts of the United States Supreme Court’s land use
jurisprudence usually begin with the 1920s.1 In that decade, the Court
handed down four significant decisions— Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon,2 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,3 Miller v. Schoene,4 and
Nectow v. Cambridge,5 which are usually credited with establishing
the terms for a debate over the limits of state regulation under the
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. Ph.D, Harvard University; J.D.,
University of Virginia; A.B., Oberlin College. 
1. For a summary of the conventional history, see J. HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 121-34 (1998). For the early history of zoning, see generally, F.
BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF
LAND USE CONTROL (1973) and R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1967). 
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
4. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
5. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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police power that has now raged for eight decades.
Almost forgotten is the fact that during the preceding two decades
the Supreme Court heard numerous challenges to state and municipal
land use regulations. In these cases, which required the Court to
define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that
one could not be deprived of property without due process of law, the
supposedly property-rights oriented Fuller and White Courts sided
with the state in almost every instance. Time after time, and with only
one dissenting vote in two decades, the Court found that the police
power was sufficiently broad to warrant restrictions on the use of
land, even when they eliminated existing uses and imposed severe
economic loss on landowners. These cases provided a strong pro-
regulation backdrop against which the cases of the 1920s were
decided.
I. THE FULLER COURT (1888-1910)
During its first twelve years, the Fuller Court (1888-1910) was not
called upon to decide any land use cases. However, between 1900
and 1910, it handed down five decisions involving municipal
ordinances that either confined particular usages to specific districts
or banned the usage altogether. The first of these cases was L’Hote v.
New Orleans in 1900.6
A. L’Hote v. New Orleans
In July 1896 the Louisiana legislature approved a new city charter
for New Orleans, replacing the one issued in 1882.7 Section 15 of the
new charter authorized the city to regulate prostitution, and among
the powers granted was the authority to restrict brothels and other
dwelling places of prostitutes to a specific district within the city.
There was nothing new about this approach; in fact, the city had
imposed such a requirement as early as 1857, and similar provisions
had been included in the 1870 and 1882 city charters.
 
6. 177 U.S. 587 (1900). 
7. Unless otherwise noted the factual background of all cases discussed in this article are
taken from the published case reports, both state and federal.
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Pursuant to this provision New Orleans Common Council adopted
a new ordinance on January 29, 1897, which declared it unlawful “for
any public prostitute or woman notoriously abandoned to lewdness to
occupy, inhabit, live or sleep in any house, room or closet situated
without the following limits. . ..” The ordinance then defined an area
of the city bounded by the Custom House, Basin, Robertson, and St.
Louis Streets. Only the southern side of the last mentioned street was
included in the district.
Before the ordinance took effect on October 1, the Common
Council concluded that the boundaries in the original ordinance had
been drawn too narrowly, and on July 7, it enacted a revised
ordinance, which expanded the special “district” so that it now
included both sides of St. Louis Street as well as other areas
contiguous to the district defined by the January 29 ordinance.
Neither side of St. Louis Street had been included within the
designated area drawn by earlier ordinances.
Shortly thereafter the revised ordinance was challenged by George
L’Hote. L’Hote resided with his wife and children in a house on
Treme Street in New Orleans, which was one-half block north of St.
Louis Street. In requesting that the Civil District Court for Orleans
Parish declare the ordinance “unconstitutional, illegal, unreasonable
and oppressive” and enjoin the city and the superintendent of police
from enforcing the new boundaries, L’Hote insisted that the ordi-
nance, if enforced, would deprive him of property without due
process of law and deny him the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by both the United States and Louisiana constitutions. He
also maintained that it effectively legalized prostitution and deprived
him of his vested right to bring an action for private nuisance.
Finally, he argued that having once laid out the boundaries for the
area in which prostitutes could live, the Common Council could not,
consistent with notions of due process, redraw the lines.
L’Hote was subsequently joined in his suit by Bernardo Gonzales
Carbajal and the Church Extension Society of the Methodist Church
of New Orleans. Carbajal was a homeowner who, unlike L’Hote,
actually owned property within the area designated for prostitutes.
The Methodist Church’s Union Chapel which had a congregation of
more than six hundred including one hundred seventy children was
also located in the new district. Both Carbajal and the Church insisted
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that the new district lines would severely damage the value of their
property; the Church in fact maintained that some of its members
were now leaving the congregation as construction of brothels,
saloons, and concert halls had already begun in the district even
before the ordinance took effect. In contrast to L’Hote, who was
willing to accept the continuation of the old district lines, both of the
intervenors took the position that the plan for a special district for
prostitutes was unreasonable and unconstitutional regardless of where
the lines were drawn.
This distinction was apparently crucial for the District Court judge
who enjoined the city on behalf of L’Hote but dismissed the petitions
of the two intervenors. Both the city and the Methodist Church
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. In an
opinion that cited no cases as authority, the higher court upheld the
ordinance in all respects and dissolved the injunction awarded to
L’Hote.8 While it admitted that a truly arbitrary drawing of lines
could give rise to a valid cause of action, the court’s Justice Miller
found that the record showed that St. Louis Street and the other new
areas were sufficiently close to the old district that the new district
lines were not “arbitrary, or as calling for any substantial sacrifice of
private rights beyond that required by antecedent ordinances.”9 Citing
the highly respected treatise Dillon on Municipal Corporations, the
court concluded:
[P]olice laws and regulations, though they may disturb the
enjoyment of individual rights, are not unconstitutional. They
do not expropriate property for public use. If the individual
sustains injury it is deemed damnum absque injuria, or in the
theory of the law, the injury to the owner is deemed
compensated by the public benefit the regulation is designed to
subserve.10
After the Louisiana court denied his petition for a rehearing, L’Hote
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. His case was argued on
 
8. L’Hote v. City of New Orleans, 51 La. Ann. 93 (1898). 
9. Id. at 98. 
10. Id. at 98-99 (quoting JOHN F. DILLON, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS 793 (4th ed. 1890)).
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March 20, 1900, and responsibility for the Court’s opinion was
assigned to Associate Justice David Josiah Brewer.
When the Supreme Court heard L’Hote’s arguments, it had few
precedents of its own in the area of land use control. In Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park (1878), it had upheld an Illinois Supreme Court
ruling that let stand a village ordinance banning the manufacture of
animal fertilizer within its limits even though the affected company
possessed a state charter authorizing its operation for fifty years on its
current site.11 Rejecting the company’s challenge under the
Constitution’s Contracts Clause, the Court ruled that corporate
charters were implicitly subject to the state police power, and so long
as it was exercised properly, there was no impairment of the
obligation of contracts even if the company was required to shut
down its entire operation.
In Mugler v. Kansas (1887), the Court upheld a statute enacted
pursuant to an amendment to the Kansas Constitution, which
outlawed the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages for all but
a few limited purposes.12 Mugler was the operator of a brewery that
he claimed had been made virtually worthless as a result of the
amendment. When convicted of continuing to manufacture and sell
alcoholic beverages, he challenged his conviction on the grounds that
the amendment constituted a deprivation of property in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Kansas Supreme Court
upheld his conviction, while his appeal was pending before the
Supreme Court, the federal circuit court for Kansas had declared a
revised version of the statute unconstitutional in State v. Walruff13
(1886) on due process grounds. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
upheld the statute and the constitutional amendment on the grounds
that the people of Kansas had determined that the manufacture and
sale of alcoholic beverages constituted a nuisance and that the state
was within it powers to make sure that the nuisance was abated.
In a third case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), decided the year
before Mugler, the Court struck down the application of a San
Francisco ordinance prohibiting the operation of laundries in wooden
 
11. 97 U.S. 659 (1878). 
12. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
13. 26 F. 178 (1886).
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buildings without a city license when it was demonstrated that
Chinese applicants for licenses were always turned down while
Caucasian applicants were always accepted.14 This was a clear abuse
of the police power of the state, according to Justice Stanley
Mathews, and the city could not hide its discriminatory motive
behind a facially neutral statute. Taken together the three cases
suggested that neither the Contracts Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment limited the state police power so long as the governmen-
tal entity had in fact acted on behalf of the public health, welfare, and
safety. If the exercise was legitimate, then the amount of economic
loss that fell upon a particular property owner seemed irrelevant.
Furthermore, the passage from Dillon on Corporations cited by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in L’Hote’s case suggested that state
courts applied a similar standard.
However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the willingness to
tolerate significant economic injury in the name of the police power
had come under attack. The most influential critic was law professor
and legal scholar Christopher Tiedeman who argued forcefully that
American courts had tolerated a much more expansive use of the
police power than was warranted and that property owners were too
often denied the compensation to which they were entitled. In
addition, from the bench, there was no more outspoken opponent of
the abuse of the state police power than David Josiah Brewer. As a
member of the Kansas Supreme Court, Brewer had refused to join the
majority opinion in State v. Mugler,15 and it was Brewer as a United
States Circuit Court judge who had declared the Kansas Prohibition
Act unconstitutional.16 Although this latter ruling was implicitly
reversed by the Supreme Court’s Mugler opinion, his belief that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed real limitations on the state police
power was not dampened. At different times in his career he
described the police power as the “legislative scalping knife,”17 “the
 
14. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
15. State v. Mugler, 29 Kan. 181, 194 (1883). 
16. Id.; State v. Walruff, 26 F. 178 (1886). Brewer reiterated his view of the unconstitu-
tionality of the Prohibition Act in State v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co., 32 F. 722 (1887),
which was handed down before the Supreme Court’s Mugler decision. 
17. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U.S. 79, 104-05 (1901).
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refuge of every grievous wrong upon private property,”18 and an
“omnivorous governmental mouth, swallowing individual rights and
immunities.”19
Joining the Supreme Court in 1890, Brewer quickly established
himself as the Court’s most outspoken advocate of property rights.20
His best known public address, delivered shortly after his
appointment, was entitled “The Protection of Private Property from
Public Attack” and contained numerous accusations that property was
being unconstitutionally appropriated and destroyed behind the mask
of the state police power. He also was an unabashed judicial activist
with no patience for the argument that the review of legislative
motive lay beyond the powers of the judiciary. As he stated shortly
before his appointment to the Supreme Court: “We [judges] are not
limited to the letter of the statute. We can look beyond that, and see
what is the spirit and meaning of the law, and determine whether,
under the guise of police regulation, rights guaranteed by the federal
constitution are infringed.”
In his early years on the Supreme Court, he sought unsuccessfully
to convince his colleagues to overrule the Court’s 1878 holding in
Munn v. Illinois21 that the state police power included the right to
regulate prices for businesses “clothed with the public interest.”22 He
had greater success in cases involving the constitutionality of railroad
rate regulation in which Brewer’s position that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed the regulated party the right to earn some
profit was eventually adopted by the Court as a whole.23 Moreover,
 
18. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Drainage Comm’rs, 200 U.S. 561, 600 (1906). 
19. 55 NEW ENG. & YALE REV. 97 (1891), reprinted in 10 RY. & CORP. L.J. 281 (1891). 
20. Ex parte Kieffer, 40 F. 399, 401 (1889). 
21. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
22. Brewer’s unsuccessful efforts came in Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892), and
Brass v. North Dakota, 154 U.S. 391 (1894). In arguing that the regulation of rates of ordinary
business constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law, Brewer distinguished
ordinary businesses, specifically unincorporated grain elevators from corporations and
enterprises like common carriers and inns which had historically been viewed as quasi-public.
In Brewer’s view, only the rates of the latter could be regulated. 
23. See Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Dey, 35 F. 866 (1888); Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co. v. Becker, 35 F. 883 (1888). Although Brewer was not the
author of Smythe v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the decision upheld a ruling he had made while
riding circuit. Ames v. Union P. R. Co., 64 F. 165 (C.C.D. Neb. 1894). Because railroads were
incorporated, Brewer acknowledged that they were subject to rate regulation; however, to force
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prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court he had embraced the
view that it was not always sufficient that governmental action be
based on a legitimate exercise of the police power. In the Kansas
prohibition cases, he first mused over and then embraced the position
that an otherwise valid exercise of the police power can be
unconstitutional if it imposed too great an economic loss on someone
whose actions were not in and of themselves a nuisance (like the
operator of a brewery).
Unfortunately for L’Hote neither Brewer nor any of his colleagues
found merit to his arguments. Although Brewer acknowledged that
the police power could not interfere with individual rights protected
by the Constitution, he rejected L’Hote’s claim that the ordinance
was an improper exercise of the police power. Brewer acknowledged
that the social problem involved in this case was a difficult one and
that the solution chosen by the New Orleans Common Council might
not be the wisest. However, he emphasized, “it is no part of the
judicial function to determine the wisdom or folly of a regulation by
the legislative body in respect to matters of a police nature.”24
Brewer found L’Hote’s argument that the ordinance constituted a
taking of his property without compensation equally unpersuasive.
Although L’Hote had asserted in his original petition that the
ordinance, if allowed to take effect, would render his property useless
for residential purposes and significantly diminish its value, Brewer
clearly was not persuaded that would be the effect. Unlike the
prohibition cases in which Brewer had been persuaded that the near
destruction of value of the breweries warranted a finding that
compensation was due, in L’Hote’s case he saw the effects of the
statute as merely inflicting a “pecuniary injury.” As he put it: “The
truth is, that the exercise of the police power often works pecuniary
injury, but the settled rule of this court is that the mere fact of
pecuniary injury does not warrant the overthrow of legislation of a
police character.”25 For authority, he cited Fertilizing Company v.
Hyde Park, and, somewhat ironically, Mugler v. Kansas. Although
them to operate without a profit would be tantamount, he argued, to taking the property of their
investors without compensation. 
24. 177 U.S. at 597. 
25. Id. at 598.
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Brewer admitted that those cases had involved injury to those who
had committed prohibited acts (i.e., operating a brewery or fertilizer
plant in violation of law), whereas L’Hote had done nothing
inappropriate, he rejected L’Hote’s argument that the state was
obligated to compensate “innocent” parties who suffered losses as a
result of a valid exercise of the police power. He then quoted the
same passage from Dillon on Municipal Corporations relied upon by
the Louisiana Supreme Court to the effect that property owners who
suffered injuries from a valid exercise of the police power were
compensated by their right to share in the general benefits, “which
the regulations are intended and calculated to secure.”26
Finally, Brewer emphasized the speculative nature of L’Hote’s
injury. As he put it, the law in question “subjected that [L’Hote’s]
property to no burden, it cast no duty or restraint upon it, and only in
an indirect way can it be said that its pecuniary value was affected by
this ordinance.”27 Moreover, Brewer noted, not only were the
damages indirect, they were uncertain. There was no assurance that
any prostitutes would move into L’Hote’s neighborhood, and even if
they did, L’Hote could force them to move by bringing an action for
private nuisance.
Brewer’s L’Hote opinion established the framework through
which the Supreme Court would decide land use cases for the next
two decades. The central question was whether or not the state or its
municipality had engaged in a legitimate exercise of the police
power. So long as the state was acting on behalf of the public’s health
and safety and the ordinance in question seemed reasonably directed
toward protecting those interests, an injured property owner had no
grounds for arguing either that the statute should be invalidated or
that she was entitled to compensation.
B. Banning Harmful Uses
In 1904 the Supreme Court decided two cases involving municipal
ordinances prohibiting the operation of more conventional types of
business enterprises in designated districts. In one it found the
 
26. See supra note 10. 
27. 177 U.S. at 600.
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challenged ordinance to be a legitimate exercise of the police power,
while in the other it concluded that under the facts presented the
police power rationale was insincere, and the ordinance in question
was therefore illegitimate.
On April 6, 1896 the city of St. Louis enacted an ordinance which
prohibited the establishment of any “dairy or cow stable” within the
city limits “without having first obtained permission to do so from
the municipal assembly by proper ordinance.”28 Violators were guilty
of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of one hundred to five
hundred dollars. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to a state statute
authorizing the city to “prohibit the erection of . . . cow stables and
dairies . . . within prescribed limits, and to remove and regulate the
same.”29 Dairies and stables in operation prior to the date of the
ordinance were exempted from the permission requirement.
At the time of the ordinance’s adoption, Fischer operated a dairy
and stable at 6305 Bulwer Avenue in St. Louis. Elsewhere in the city,
a different proprietor operated a similar business at 7208 and 7210
North Broadway. In March 1898 the dairy on North Broadway was
closed, and a dwelling on the premises was occupied by a family for
residence purposes only. Sometime thereafter Fischer acquired the
rights to the property on North Broadway, and in September 1898 he
moved thirty cows from the Bulwer Avenue site to the stable at 7208-
10 North Broadway and opened a dairy at that location.
On November 16, 1898 Fischer was charged in Police Court with
violating the dairy control ordinance. He defended on three grounds:
first, the use of the North Broadway stables was not prohibited by the
ordinance since they were in use as a dairy at the time the ordinance
was adopted; second, the statutory authority to prohibit the erection
of dairies “within prescribed limits” did not authorize their
prohibition from the entire city; and third, the ordinance violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.30 Fischer was convicted, and the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld his conviction in spite of his lawyer’s
assertion, “[i]f such an ordinance as the one in question be upheld,
than all our constitutional provisions for the protection of property
28. Id. at 659.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 655, 661-62, 665.
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rights are meaningless and worthless.”31
In his argument before the United States Supreme Court, Fischer
did not question the right of a community to restrict the location of
dairies. Instead, he argued that the ordinance denied him the equal
protection of the laws since it allowed some individuals to continue
to operate dairies in the city while denying the right to others.
Furthermore, he insisted that the ordinance was deficient on due
process grounds because the city assembly had reserved for itself the
authority to decide who could operate and who could not and because
the statute delegated a judicial power— the authority to determine
what constituted a nuisance to— a legislative body.32
In a very brief opinion, Justice Henry Brown, writing for a
unanimous court, dismissed Fischer’s claims. “The power of the
legislature to authorize municipalities,” Brown wrote, “to regulate
and suppress all such places or occupations as in its judgment are
likely to be injurious to the health of its inhabitants or to disturb
people living in the immediate neighborhood by loud noises or
offensive odors, is so clearly within the police power as to be no
longer open to question.”33 Although Brown acknowledged that some
state courts had questioned the constitutional legitimacy of vesting a
dispensing power with individual officials, he insisted that the city
assembly’s retention of the power to permit the keeping of cattle
within city boundaries did not make the ordinance constitutionally
suspect. As Brown noted, there were many reasons why a licensing
authority might permit one dairy and not another— the size of the two
operations, their proposed locations, or the reputations of their
operators for “good order and cleanliness.”34 There was no problem
with granting a license to one party and not another so long as the
discrimination was made in the public interest. Brown did
acknowledge that there might be situations where the power to issue
permits was abused and where licenses could be issued or denied for
reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the application. If
such conditions were present (as in Yick Wo), then the Court could
 
31. Fischer v. City of St. Louis, 167 Mo. 657, 656 (1902).
32. Fischer v. City of St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361, 370-72 (1904). 
33. Id. at 370.
34. Id. at 371.
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properly invalidate the action.
Later that year, the Court heard what appeared to be just such a
case. In August 1901 the city council of Los Angeles adopted an
ordinance requiring that all gasworks in the city be operated within a
specified district. The following month Caroline W. Dobbins
purchased a tract of land within the designated area, and on
November 22 the Los Angeles Board of Fire Commissioners granted
her a permit to erect a gasworks on the newly purchased site.
Dobbins’ agents, the Valley Gas and Fuel Company, immediately
began construction.35
However, three days after construction began on Dobbins’
gasworks, the Los Angeles City Council amended its gasworks
ordinance so that Dobbins site was no longer within the district in
which gasworks were permitted. At the time of the amendment, the
foundations for Dobbins proposed gasworks had been substantially
completed at a cost in excess of twenty-five hundred dollars.36
Dobbins’ agents apparently continued to build in spite of the
amended ordinance, and in late February 1902, the city began arrest-
ing workers engaged in building the Dobbins’ gasworks. In an
attempt to remove any doubts about the legitimacy of the earlier
amendment to the gasworks act, the City Council on March 3d
enacted a completely new gasworks ordinance, which also placed the
Dobbins site outside of the permitted area.37
Dobbins then filed a bill of complaint in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County asking that the city be enjoined from enforcing the
revised gasworks ordinance against her and her employees. In her
complaint she alleged that the area in which she had begun
construction was an industrial area suitable for the construction of
gasworks and that her proposed structure was to be built on a
concrete foundation with a superstructure of non-combustible
materials, which as such posed no special danger. She also alleged
that the action of the city council had been taken at the behest of the
35. Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179, 181-84 (1903).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 182.
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Los Angeles Lighting Company, which was the operator of the only
gasworks in the city.38
The city demurred, and the Superior Court dismissed the com-
plaint, apparently on the grounds that an ordinance regulating the
location of the gasworks was clearly within the police powers of the
city and therefore subject to no further review. Dobbins appealed to
the California Supreme Court, but the lower court dismissal was up-
held.39 On appeal, the court held that the regulation of gasworks was
clearly within in the power of the municipality and, citing Chief
Justice Morrison Waite’s observation in Munn v. Illinois that the
reasonableness of a particular exercise of the police power was a
legislative, not a judicial, matter. Thus, the Court announced that an
examination of legislative motive for the revision of the Los Angeles
gasworks ordinance was not a proper function for the judiciary.40
In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, Justice William Day revealed just how
far the Supreme Court had moved since Munn when it came to the
review of legislative motive.41 While Day acknowledged for a
unanimous court that the regulation of the location of gasworks was
unquestionably appropriate, he denied that the City Council’s
decision as to where to locate the gasworks was non-reviewable.
Citing a variety of more recent United States Supreme Court
decisions including Lawton v. Steele,42 Holden v. Hardy,43 and
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,44 Day asserted that such review
was entirely proper. As he put it:
[I]t is now thoroughly well settled by decisions of this court
that municipal by-laws and ordinances . . . are subject to
investigation in the courts with a view to determining whether
the law or ordinance is a lawful exercise of the police power,
or whether under the guise of enforcing police regulations
there has been an unwarranted and arbitrary interference with
38. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 226-27 (1904). 
39. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179 (1902).
40. 139 Cal. at 183, 186. 
41. 195 U.S. 223 (1904). 
42. 152 U.S. 133 (1899). 
43. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
44. 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
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the constitutional rights to carry on a lawful business, to make
contracts, or to use and enjoy property.45
Once the Court acknowledged that this type of review was
appropriate, the result was fairly obvious. Since the city had
demurred to Dobbins’ bill of complaint, the Court was obligated to
accept the validity of all of her statements of fact. Dobbins had
asserted that her proposed gasworks were safe, that they were
perfectly suited for their location, that the change is the ordinance
was not necessary to protect the public interest, and that the city
council had acted to protect the monopoly status of another private
gas company. If these assertions were correct, a court could hardly
conclude that the challenged ordinance was a legitimate exercise of
the police power.
It would be a mistake, however, to read too much into Justice
Day’s opinion, since the Court was not required to say that the city
had in fact acted in an unconstitutional fashion or that Dobbins had
been deprived of her property without due process of law. All the
Court held was that the original trial court should have overruled the
city’s demurrer and heard evidence on the validity of Dobbins claims.
Moreover, Day was careful to explain that the court was not holding
that Los Angeles could not change the boundary lines for its
gasworks district. He also acknowledged that notwithstanding the
building permit, the city could subsequently prohibit the maintenance
of gasworks in a district even once construction was completed if the
structure now represented a menace to the public health and safety.
“In other words,” Day wrote, “the right to exercise the police power
is a continuing one, and a business lawful to-day may in the future,
because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other
causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good.”46 Citing Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde
Park as authority, Day gave no indication that compensation would
be required in such a situation.47
Consequently, although Dobbins indicated the Court’s belief that
 
45. 195 U.S. at 236. 
46. 195 U.S. at 238. 
47. Day also cited New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 672
(1885), which had reiterated the general principles of Fertilizing Co.
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truly bad-faith exercises of the police power were prohibited, L’Hote,
Fischer, and Dobbins together suggested that the Court remained
favorably disposed to restrictions on the use of land. L’Hote had
apparently ruled out any possibility of relief where the damage was
only pecuniary. Fischer allowed municipalities to ban certain types of
lawful businesses altogether (as opposed to restricting them to
districts within the city) and accepted the principal of discretionary
permits. Dobbins suggested that when the public interest required it,
lawful businesses could be forced to relocate without a right to
compensation. Of course, the Court insisted that it had the right to
scrutinize the situation to make sure that the police power was not
being improperly invoked, but there was little reason to believe in
1904 that it was inclined to use its power to impede the development
of zoning and other forms of land use control.
C. New Uses for the Police Power
Limiting agricultural usages in urban areas (Fischer) and restrict-
ing the location of potentially dangerous enterprises (Dobbins) were
hardly controversial usages of the police power. However in 1909
and 1910, the Fuller Court heard two cases involving new and more
innovative applications. The first involved restrictions on the height
of buildings and the second, a county-wide moratorium on human
burial.
In 1906 Francis C. Welch, acting in his capacity as a trustee,
applied to the building inspector of the City of Boston for permission
to construct a building 124.5 feet in height on a lot on the corner of
Arlington and Marlborough Streets in the Back Bay section of
Boston. The request was refused on the grounds that the lot in
question was located in a district in which the height of any new
building was limited by ordinance to no more than one hundred
feet.48
The restrictions involved were the product of a 1904 act of the
Massachusetts legislature that created a “Commission on Height of
Buildings in the City of Boston” and divided the city into two
districts labeled A and B. District A included those parts of the city in
48. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 366 (1907).
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which a majority of buildings were currently used for business or
commercial purposes, while District B was made up of areas where
the predominant use was residential. Under the original ordinance
new buildings were limited to one hundred twenty-five feet in height
in District A and to eighty feet in District B. A revision of the statute
the following year permitted the Commission to authorize buildings
up to one hundred feet in certain parts of District B and up to one
hundred twenty-five feet for lots in District B within twenty-five feet
of the boundary between the two sections, provided that the owner
also owned land in District A.49
The 1904 and 1905 acts represented a new approach to the control
of building heights in Boston. In 1891 a Massachusetts state law
applicable to every city in the state had limited the heights of new
buildings to one hundred twenty-five feet above street grade.50 In
1898 the state legislature further limited the height of buildings
around Boston’s Copley Square to ninety feet and the following year
imposed a seventy foot cap on new buildings on Beacon Hill in the
vicinity of the State House. Both of these statutes had characterized
the height restrictions as takings of property under the state’s power
of eminent domain and had provided for compensation. A series of
decisions— including one by the United States Supreme Court— had
upheld the validity of this use of the eminent domain power and of
the compensation provisions provided by the statutes.51 However, in
1904 the Massachusetts legislature embraced the position that the
height of buildings could be restricted under the police power without
incurring an obligation to compensate.
Welch’s lot was clearly more than twenty-five feet from the line
separating the two districts and thus did not qualify for an exception.
When his request for a permit was denied, he appealed to the Board
49. Id. at 367-69. 
50. An 1892 act specifically imposed the same limitation on Boston. 
51. Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903); Attorney General v. Williams, 178 Mass.
330 (1901); Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199 (1901); Attorney General v. Williams,
174 Mass. 476 (1899). In the latter case, the Court, in an opinion by Brewer, found the
compensation scheme provided by the state to satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brewer also stated that the Court at that time took no position on the argument
that the height restrictions could be justified on the basis of the police power alone.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/2
p+1+Hylton.doc 01/04/01
2000] Prelude to Euclid 17
of Appeal that oversaw the decisions of the building commissioner.52
When the Board upheld the original decision, Welch petitioned the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for a writ of mandamus
compelling the Board to issue him a building permit. Welch
conceded that his proposed building was higher than the current law
permitted, but he maintained that the statutes upon which the refusal
was based were void. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and
ruled that the statutes at question were constitutional since they were
enacted on behalf of public health and safety.53
Welch argued before the Supreme Court that the height
restrictions could not be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police
power. The appearance of buildings taller than one hundred twenty-
five feet in cities other than Boston with no ill effects was proof, he
argued, that the public safety did not require such restrictions as those
adopted by the Massachusetts acts. Moreover, he claimed that the
purpose behind the acts in question was purely aesthetic, i.e., they
had been adopted only to preserve architectural symmetry and regular
sky-lines. (Massachusetts’ highest court had asserted that the police
power could not be used for exclusively aesthetic purposes as
recently as 1903.54) Since they reduced the value of the affected
parcels but were not designed to protect the public health and safety
the acts were, therefore, arbitrary and unreasonable. In addition,
Welch insisted that the difference between one hundred twenty-five
feet and one hundred or eighty feet was wholly arbitrary so that even
if the subject of the statutes was a legitimate object of the police
power, the statutes were still unreasonable because they imposed a
great deal of economic loss on individuals for a minimal public bene-
fit.55 In reply, the lawyers for the city insisted that the Supreme Court
should defer to the conclusions of the Massachusetts legislature and
Supreme Judicial Court that the statutes represented a reasonable use
of the police power and that they were not based solely on aesthetic
considerations but on issues of public safety as well.56
52. 193 Mass., at 366. 
53. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364 (1907). 
54. Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Company, 188 Mass. 348 (1905).
55. Id. at 98, 100.
56. Id. at 101-02.
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The decision in Welch v. Swasey57 was written by Justice Rufus
Peckham, the author of the majority opinion in Lochner v. New
York58 and a staunch defender of property rights.59 However,
Peckham had no difficulty upholding the Massachusetts statute. Since
Welch had conceded that the state had the power to place general
limits on the heights of buildings, the only issue, according to
Peckham writing for a unanimous court, was whether or not the
height restrictions in District B bore some reasonable relationship to
the police power.60
True to the principles of substantive due process, Peckham began
by noting that the state supreme court decision on the reasonableness
of the statute was not binding on the United States Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, he explained, that decision was entitled to great defer-
ence, and since the Massachusetts court had found the statute to be
based on concern for the safety of the citizens residents, the Supreme
Court could hardly say that the limitation here was “so unreasonable
that it deprives the owner of the property of its profitable uses
without justification, and that he is therefore entitled under the
Constitution to compensation for such invasion of his rights.”61 In
fact, Peckham indicated that he agreed the discrimination was
reasonable and that the acts in question were justified by the police
power.
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, which
reached the Court the following year, proved no more difficult to
resolve.62 The appellant was the operator of a large cemetery that
opened in 1854 in a rural area and had been incorporated in 1867.
Over time the San Francisco area developed around it and by 1900,
over forty thousand lots had been sold. On March 26, 1900 local
authorities enacted the San Francisco Burial Ordinance which
dictated that after August 1, 1901 no further burials would be
permitted within the City and County of San Francisco. An earlier act
 
57. 214 U.S. 91 (1909). 
58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
59. See William Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of Ex Parte Young:
Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980 BRIGHAM YOUNG U.L. REV. 539.
60. Id. 
61. 214 U.S. at 107. 
62. 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
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had prohibited burials in the city or county except in existing
cemeteries or in those approved by the San Francisco County Board
of Supervisors, but this was the first time that burials had been
banned throughout the county.63 The ordinance was based on the
police power, and it stated specifically in its text that the burial of the
dead within the jurisdiction was “dangerous to life and detrimental to
the public health.” At the time the ordinance took effect, the appellant
still owned unsold lots worth seventy-five thousand dollars.64
When the Laurel Hill Cemetery sought to restrain the enforcement
of the ordinance, its request was denied by the trial court, and the
denial was subsequently upheld on appeal.65 Although the appellant’s
case was rooted in the claim that it had been deprived of property
without due process of law, its argument did not focus upon the
impact of the ordinance on the value of the unsold lots. There was no
claim that the ordinance left the unsold lots without value, since
much of the land could presumably be used for other purposes.
Instead, Laurel Hill sought to convince the court that the premise
upon which the ordinance was based— that the burial of the dead
posed a health threat to the living— was so contrary to the scientific
evidence that the act was an unreasonable exercise of the police
power.66
For the first time in a land use case, the opinion for the Supreme
Court was written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes had
been appointed to the Court in 1902 and had concurred in Fischer,
Dobbins, and Welch v. Swasey. In Laurel Hill he upheld the refusal to
issue an injunction for a unanimous court. In his opinion Holmes
began by emphasizing the importance of deferring to the judgment of
local authorities on questions of reasonableness in a manner that was
reminiscent of his famous Lochner dissent. In his opinion he took a
mild swipe at Dobbins (in which he had concurred) and Lochner,
suggesting that in those cases the Court had incautiously second
guessed state officials. He then pointed out that Justice Peckham, the
 
63. The constitutionality of the earlier ordinance had been upheld by the California
Supreme Court in Odd Fellows’ Assn. v. San Francisco, 140 Cal. 226 (1903).
64. 216 U.S. at 363. 
65. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 152 Cal. 464 (1907).
66. 216 U.S. at 359-60.
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author of the majority opinion in Lochner but now retired, had
counselled just the sort of deference in Welch v. Swasey that he
(Holmes) now advocated.67
However, having made the case for deferring to the California
Supreme Court’s determination that the ordinance at issue was a
reasonable exercise of the police power, Holmes suggested that it was
the long tradition of the regulation of burial and the prohibition of it
in certain locales that established the reasonableness of this type of
regulation. In the opinion’s final sentence— “The plaintiff must wait
until there is a change of practice or at least an established consensus
of civilized opinion before it can expect this court to overthrow the
rules that the lawmakers and the court of his own State uphold”68—
Holmes acknowledged that there were situations where deference
might be inappropriate. Although the tone of Holmes’ opinion made
it clear that he did not expect such cases to be a common occurrence,
even he acknowledged that a police power regulation that was
contrary to “an established consensus of civilized opinion” could be
invalidated.69
II. THE WHITE COURT (1910-21)
By 1911 the Supreme Court had undergone a dramatic change in
personnel. Fuller, Brown, Peckham, Brewer, and Harlan, the
mainstays of the Fuller Court, had all left the bench, and only Justices
McKenna and White (named chief justice in 1910) remained from the
Court that had decided L’Hote. Nevertheless, the land use decisions
of the second decade of the twentieth century saw no significant
departures from the standards applied in the first. While the White
Court did strike down ordinances restricting the use of land in two
cases, both involved atypical circumstances. In Eubank v. Richmond
(discussed below), the issue was not the legitimacy of the restriction
but the fact that regulatory authority had been delegated to private
citizens. 70 In Buchanan v. Warley, the land use restriction did not
67. Id. at 365. 
68. 216 U.S. at 366.
69. Id. at 366. 
70. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
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pertain to the actual usage of the land but was a residential
segregation scheme, which restricted the sale of land on the basis of
race.71 In seven more conventional cases, the Court had little
difficulty upholding the restrictions at issue.
A. The Costs of Retroactive Application
On three occasions between 1912 and 1915, the White Court was
presented with challenges to land use regulations that prohibited
previously lawful uses and imposed substantial economic losses on
the private parties involved. Without denying the magnitude of the
injuries suffered, the Court found that no constitutional violation had
occurred in any of the cases.
In Murphy v. California, the appellant, J. L. Murphy, was the
operator of a billiard parlor in South Pasadena, California.72 At a time
when no restrictions were in place regulating such establishments
Murphy had rented space in a building in the town’s commercial
district and had outfitted it with pool tables and other appropriate
equipment. Then at the beginning of January 1908, the municipality
adopted an ordinance that “prohibited any person from keeping or
maintaining any hall or room in which billiard or pool tables were
kept for hire or public use.”73 Murphy refused to close and was
arrested on January 18. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
denied by both the California Court of Appeals and the California
Supreme Court.74
Murphy was then tried in the Recorder’s Court (a police court),
found guilty, and ordered to pay a fine. Unwilling to give in, he
appealed his conviction to the County Superior Court where it was
upheld.75 Under California law there was no right of appeal for a
misdemeanor conviction to either the Court of Appeals or the
California Supreme Court, so Murphy appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court. For his appeal, Murphy retained noted
Chicago attorneys Alfred Austrian and Levy Mayer.
 
71. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
72. 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
73. Id. at 441. 
74. Ex parte Murphy, 8 Cal. App. 440 (1908).
75. 225 U.S. at 628.
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Murphy’s investment in high priced legal counsel did not achieve
the desired result. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Joseph
Lamar dismissed the claim that the ordinance unconstitutionally
deprived Murphy of the right to follow a lawful occupation that was
not a nuisance per se. While Lamar admitted that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected the right of a citizen to “engage in any lawful
business,” the protection, he explained, did not prevent states from
regulating lawful occupations, “which, because of their nature or
location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public.”76 Certainly
Lamar had no difficulty seeing Murphy’s “occupation” as falling in
the latter category. As he put it, “[t]hat the keeping of a billiard hall
has a harmful tendency is a fact requiring no proof.”77 As for the
pecuniary damages Murphy incurred (or would incur) by the closing
of his business, Lamar insisted that such losses were entirely
foreseeable since he was engaged in an occupation that “he was
bound to know could lawfully be regulated out of existence.”78 The
Court also dismissed Murphy’s claim that he was denied the equal
protection of the laws because the ordinance contained an exception
for large hotel which were permitted to maintain a billiard room for
the exclusive use of their guests.
Reinman v. City of Little Rock also involved a municipal
ordinance that required the closing of a previously lawful business.79
This time the ordinance in question prohibited the operation of livery
stables in the main commercial district of Little Rock. Reinman had
operated a livery stable in that district for many years and rather than
comply with the ordinance, he filed a bill of complaint in the Pulaski
County Chancery Court requesting that the city be enjoined from
enforcing the new restrictions. In support of his request, Reinman did
not attack the reasonableness of the regulation of stables in urban
areas (which was unquestionablely permitted) but instead focused
upon the particular unfairness of the ordinance as applied to his
situation. First, he argued that he had established his business at the
encouragement of the city, and to operate it more effectively he had
 
76. 225 U.S. at 628. 
77. Id. at 629. 
78. Id. at 630. 
79. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
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constructed brick stables, which could neither be relocated nor
reasonably used for any other purpose.80 Then, echoing Dobbins, he
claimed that passage of the ordinance had been secured by certain
named individuals (not made defendants) who desired to purchase his
property at a low price and use it for other purposes.81
Reinman was able to convince the local chancery court judge to
issue a permanent restraining order, but the order was vacated by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas on February 24, 1913.82 His appeal to the
United States Supreme Court failed to alter the result. “So long as the
regulation in question,” Justice Pitney wrote for the Court:
is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and
operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated in the
particular district, the district itself not appearing to have been
arbitrarily selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is
a deprivation of property without due process of law, or a
denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment.83
Pitney admitted that if it could be shown that the ordinance in
question failed to confer a public benefit while imposing a substantial
economic harm on Reinman, then the ordinance would be deemed
unreasonable and an arbitrary exercise of the police power. Here,
however, the Arkansas Supreme Court had determined that the
ordinance addressed a legitimate public need and that Reinman had
failed to establish his claim that it had been improperly motivated.
Pitney saw no reason to question that court’s judgment.
The final and the best known of the retroactive application cases
was Hadacheck v. Sebastian,84 which like Murphy, Faith Hill
Cemetery, and Dobbins, arose in California. In 1902 J. C. Hadacheck
purchased an eight acre tract of land outside the city of Los Angeles,
which contained substantial amounts of clay. Hadacheck installed
kilns and other brick-making machinery on the tract and began
80. Id. at 173.
81. Id. 
82. City of Little Rock v. Reinman-Wolfart Auto. Livery Co., 107 Ark. 174 (1913). 
83. 237 U.S. at 177. 
84. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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producing bricks. When the tract was subsequently incorporated into
the city of Los Angeles, his business continued undeterred. However,
in April 1910 the city adopted a “Brick Yard Ordinance,” which
prohibited the manufacture of bricks in a three square mile area,
including Hadacheck’s property.85
Hadacheck refused to comply with the ordinance and was
convicted of a misdemeanor. He was sentenced to time in jail, and
while in the custody, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
with the California Supreme Court. In his petition, Hadacheck
asserted that his land was worth eight hundred thousand dollars as a
brickyard, but only sixty thousand dollars for some other purpose,
and that the deep excavations done to remove the clay made it
unlikely that the land would be used for any other purposes. The writ
was issued, but after receiving the city’s answer, the higher court
determined that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police
power and remanded the defendant to the Los Angeles County
Sheriff.86 Hadacheck then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, but while waiting for his case to be heard, he filed a separate
action in Los Angeles County Superior Court seeking an injunction
restraining the city from implementing the Brick Yard Ordinance. In
this second case Hadacheck presented additional evidence osten-
sively demonstrating that the ordinance was unreasonable and “ill-
digested.” The request was refused, and in March 1915, the Supreme
Court of California again upheld the ordinance.87
Seven months later the United States Supreme Court heard his
appeal from the denial of the writ of habeas corpus. Predictably,
Hadacheck argued that the ordinance was unreasonable and that its
enforcement would destroy his entire investment in his property.
Writing for the Court, Justice Joseph McKenna reiterated the
standard enunciated by Justice Pitney in Reinman. If the ordinance
could be shown to be arbitrary, it would be invalid. However, the
arbitrariness of the ordinance must be apparent, and in the present
case, McKenna noted, Hadacheck’s claim of arbitrariness had been
rebutted by the city and rejected by the courts of California. The fact
85. Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 416 (1913) 
86. Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416 (1913). 
87. Hadacheck v. Alexander, 169 Cal. 616 (1915).
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that Hadacheck suffered substantial damage— by his account, the
value of his property was reduced by 92.5%— was unfortunate but
not grounds for attacking the legitimacy of the police power. As
McKenna explained, “It [the police power] may, indeed, seem harsh
in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative
necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not
exerted arbitrarily.”88
McKenna did suggest that had the ordinance banned the removal
of clay from Hadacheck’s property (as opposed to the manufacture of
bricks on it) it might be deemed arbitrary and unenforceable. As
McKenna noted, the Supreme Court of California had reached such a
conclusion a decade earlier in a case involving a ban on removing
rock and stone from quarries within San Francisco County where the
court found no showing that such an extreme solution was neces-
sary.89 However, McKenna was quick to point out that the Brick Yard
Ordinance permitted Hadacheck to remove clay from his property
and use it to make bricks at another location. While Hadacheck
denied this could be done, he was not claiming physical impossibility
but only that he did not believe that it could done profitably, which
was insufficient grounds for challenging an otherwise valid exercise
of the police power. Whether an absolute ban on removal might be
unconstitutional was, according to McKenna, a question for another
time.
B. Administrative Discretion and the Police Power
In Fischer v. St. Louis, Fischer tried to argue that the power
granted to the city government to issue (or deny) licenses for stables
on a case by case basis offended the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although Fischer’s argument failed, during the 1910s the White
Court heard a number of challenges to police power regulations on
similar grounds. These cases reflected a growing trend toward
flexible land use controls as well as an awareness that challenges to
the reasonableness of regulation per se were unlikely to succeed.
In Eubank v. The City of Richmond (1912), this approach
 
88. 239 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added). 
89. In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609 (1905).
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appeared to work as the Supreme Court invalidated a land use
ordinance for the first time.90 At issue in Eubank was a Richmond,
Virginia ordinance that allowed the owners of two-thirds of the land
abutting any street to request the city Committee on Streets to
establish a building line on the side of the square on which their
property fronted. If such a request were made in writing, the
committee was required to lay out a building line at least five but not
more than thirty feet from the street. Once the line was established,
no new building permits were to be issued for that side of the block
except for structures that complied with the building line.
Eubank was the owner of a lot on Grace Street in Richmond
located between 28th and 29th Streets. On December 19, 1908 he
received permission to build a detached brick building on the site.
However, on January 9, 1909 the owners of two-thirds of the lots on
Grace Street between 28th and 29th petitioned the Committee on
Streets for a building line. The committee responded by establishing
a building line fourteen feet from the street. Eubank, who had
purchased material for his building but had yet to begin construction,
was then notified by the building inspector that his house would have
to comply with the new line. As planned, Eubank’s house was set
back fourteen feet from the street except for an “octagon bay
window,” which protruded three feet beyond the new line. Eubank
appealed to the Board of Pubic Safety, which upheld the order of the
building inspector.91
Eubank then ignored the directive from the building inspector and
constructed his house as originally planned. He was in turn charged
with violating the city building line ordinance and fined twenty-five
dollars in the city police court. Although he had received the
minimum penalty under the ordinance— he could have been fined as
much as five hundred dollars— Eubank appealed his conviction to the
Hustings Court of the City of Richmond and when that court upheld
his conviction, to the Virginia Supreme Court. In a very brief
opinion, which primarily relied upon Welch v. Swasey, that Virginia
court sustained the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of the state
police power and found that the delegation of authority to the
 
90. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
91. 226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912).
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Committee on Streets was proper.92 From that decision, Eubank ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.
For the first time in a land use case, the Supreme Court found the
statute to be an unreasonable exercise of the police power and
ordered Eubank’s conviction reversed. However, the decision in no
way suggested that states and municipalities lacked the power to
establish building lines. In an opinion written by Justice McKenna,
the Court acknowledged that the police power extended to building
lines, but it found that the delegation of the authority to determine
when lines were to be established to private citizens could not be
reconciled with concern for the public health and safety. As
McKenna noted, such a system could result in inconsistent lines from
one block to the next, and it gave individuals who owned two-thirds
of the land on a particular block the power to advance their own
selfish interests at the public’s expense. Although the present case did
not present evidence of such practices, McKenna wrote, once again
for a unanimous court: “It is hard to understand how public comfort
or convenience, much less public health, can be promoted by a line
which may be so variously disposed.”93
Plymouth Coal Company v. Pennsylvania, concerned the alleged
failure of the state to provide sufficient guidelines for a procedure in
which a state official working with representatives of the affected
private parties was given the authority to impose substantial
restrictions on the use of the subsurface.94 The regulation at issue in
this case was not a municipal ordinance but a twenty-year old state
statute, which required owners of adjoining coal mines to leave
boundary pillars of coal sufficient to protect workers in the other
mine should one mine be abandoned and fill up with water.
The Plymouth Coal Company leased land containing an anthracite
coal mine in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Adjacent to their tract
was another coal mine operated by the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal
Company. Approximately three hundred miners worked the
Plymouth mine while Wilkes-Barre employed more than seven
hundred. On August 31, 1909 District Mine Inspector D. T. Davis
 
92. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 110 Va. 749 (1910). 
93. 226 U.S. at 1-42. 
94. 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
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wrote to John C. Haddock, president of Plymouth Coal, requesting
that his engineer meet with him (Davis) and the engineer for Lehigh
and Wilkes-Barre Company to determine the “thickness of barrier
pillar to be left unmined between the properties.”95 Haddock refused
to agree to such a meeting, and in October, Davis filed a bill of
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
requesting that the Plymouth Coal Company be barred from
operating its mine without leaving a proper barrier pillar. The
Company defended on the grounds that the 1891 act was “confis-
catory, unconstitutional, and void.”96
The Court of Common Pleas issued the requested injunction
prohibiting Plymouth from operating its mine unless it left a barrier
pillar at least seventy feet wide. (The injunction did provide that the
size of the pillar could be reduced if a subsequent examination
complying with the terms of the statute determined that a smaller
pillar was appropriate.) On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, Plymouth Coal unsuccessfully attacked the Anthracite Mining
Act as a taking of property without compensation under the
Pennsylvania constitution as well as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.97 It also estimated that the seventy foot wide pillar
amounted to 734,147 tons of coal, which could be mined at a profit of
about three hundred thousand dollars.
The coal company then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which heard the case in January 1914. Lawyers for Plymouth
Coal, apparently feeling that their chances of success before the
Supreme Court were very limited, decided to reduce the issues on
appeal to a single question, specifically whether the method of fixing
the width of the barrier pillar was “so crude, uncertain and unjust” as
to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. As
the Supreme Court noted in an opinion by Mahlon Pitney, this
particular issue had not been raised in the state court proceedings.
However, rather than dismiss the case on this basis, Pitney went
ahead and decided the cases on its merits and ruled for the state of
Pennsylvania. While admitting that the statute was in some regards
95. Id.
96. Id. at 536.
97. Id.
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vague as to the method to be deployed when determining the size of
the support pillar, Pitney brushed aside the appellant’s suggestion that
this made the statute constitutionally defective. Since it was possible
to read the statute in a way that resolved the ambiguities highlighted
by the appellant, he saw no reason why the Supreme Court should not
accept that interpretation.98
In 1916 the Court had the opportunity to revisit the issue of
delegating discretion to private parties. In Thomas Cusack Company
v. City of Chicago it heard a challenge to a 1910 Chicago ordinance
that prohibited the erection of billboards on blocks in which one-half
or more of the buildings were used for residential purposes.99 In spite
of the prohibition, billboards could be erected but only if the owner
of the billboard obtained the written permission of majority owners
the lots on the block on which the proposed board was to be
erected.100
In 1914 the Thomas Cusack Company, an outdoor advertising
company, attempted to have the ordinance invalidated on the grounds
that it improperly delegated decision-making authority to private
individuals, à la Eubank. While Cusack was successful in getting the
ordinance enjoined by the Superior Court of Cook County, the
Illinois Supreme Court dissolved the injunction. In an opinion which
prompted two dissents and which failed to mention Eubank v.
Richmond, the Illinois court found that the city of Chicago had the
authority to adopt such an ordinance and that the ordinance was not
unreasonable or oppressive.101 Cusack then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
In a very brief opinion written by the Court’s newest member,
Justice John Clarke, Cusack’s claim was dismissed as “palpably
frivolous.”102 Clarke asserted that the separate regulation of
billboards was clearly within the bounds of the police power and that
the delegation of the authority to decide whether or not to permit
billboards to the people themselves posed no constitutional problem.
98. Id. at 547. 
99. 242 U.S. 526 (1917). 
100. See 242 U.S. at 527 (for text of the ordinance). 
101. Cusack v. Chicago, 267 Ill. 344 (1914).
102. 242 U.S. at 530.
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As for appellant’s argument that Eubank v. Richmond ought to be
controlling, Clarke insisted that the two cases could be clearly distin-
guished, although the basis of his distinction— that the ordinance in
Eubank permitted lot owners to impose a restriction on other owners
while the ordinance in this case permitted lot owners to remove a
restriction— seemed almost disingenuous. Most likely, the Court had
realized that its decision in Eubank had been incorrect and that the
delegation of this sort of authority to private citizens could be a
beneficial land use device. Only McKenna, the author of Eubank
dissented, and he did so without opinion.103
C. Buchanan v. Warley
Buchanan v. Warley was not really a land use case since the
ordinance in question focused on who could own the land rather than
how it could be used.104 The city council of Louisville had made it
illegal to sell residential property to someone who was not a member
of the current racial majority of the city block in which the residence
was located. Over time, black homeowners in white majority blocks
would be forced to sell their homes to whites and vice versa, resulting
in a socially engineered segregation in residence that paralleled the
segregation in the public sphere mandated by the Jim Crow laws of
the era. Ordinances like this were adopted in a number of southern
cities, and they were always justified as legitimate exercises of the
police power on the theory that they promoted the public peace and
general welfare by preventing racial conflicts and preserving property
values. The Louisville, Kentucky ordinance at issue in Buchanan, for
example, was entitled: “An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-
feeling between the white and colored races of the City of
Louisville.”
Buchanan, an African-American, brought an action for specific
performance to purchase a vacant city lot at the corner of 37th Street
and Pflanz Avenue in Louisville. At the time of the contract, there
were ten residences on this particular block, eight of which were
occupied by caucasians. The contract for sale contained a provision
103. Id. at 69-70. 
104. 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
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that the buyer (Buchanan) was not obligated to purchase the property
unless he had the right to use it as residence. Since the ordinance at
issue, which had been adopted in 1914, clearly prohibited a black
buyer from purchasing a house on this block, Buchanan’s contract
was enforceable only if the ordinance was invalid. Both the local
court and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (the state’s highest court)
found the ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police power.105
While the White Court is usually given high marks by historians
for striking down the Louisville ordinance, it is usually faulted for
doing so on the basis of private property rights rather than a
constitutional protection against state mandated racial segregation.
Whatever the merits of that argument, the Court’s decision in
Buchanan did not require a departure from the standards that it had
articulated in previous cases. In L’Hote Justice Brewer had
emphasized that the police power could not be used “to infringe
private rights secured by the Constitution of the United States,”106
and in Buchanan v. Warley, the Court for the first time found such an
infringement. Reviewing the history of the post-Civil War
Constitutional Amendments Justice William Day concluded: “The
Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in furtherance of
its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire
property without state legislation discriminating against him solely
because of color.”107 Day went even further, however, and pointed
out that the statute did not even satisfy its own stated objectives. If
the goal was racial separation, that was not accomplished because the
ordinance allowed black servants to work for white families, and it
permitted whites and blacks to live next to each other if they
occupied the corner houses on adjacent blocks. Furthermore, Day
noted, prohibitions on the sale of property do not prevent the
amalgamation of the races (presumably, that was done by the state
anti-miscegenation statute) and undesirable white neighbors could do
just as much to depreciate the value of property as undesirable black
 
105. Harris v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559 (1915). At the Court of Appeals level,
Buchanan v. Warley was treated as a companion case to Harris, which involved a criminal
conviction for violating the statute. 
106. 177 U.S. at 596. 
107. 245 U.S. at 79.
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neighbors. In other words, the ordinance in this case could not be
upheld as a legitimate exercise of the police power.108 All nine
justices concurred in Day’s opinion.
D. The Final Cases
Any suggestion that Buchanan v. Warley signalled a shift to more
rigorous standards of review in land use cases was put to rest by two
decisions handed down in 1919. Both involved municipal ordinances
banning certain usages, and both were disposed of in extremely brief
opinions by Justice Holmes.
Pierce Oil Corporation v. City of Hope involved a municipal
ordinance of Hope, Arkansas (the birthplace of future President Bill
Clinton), which prohibited the storage of more than sixty gallons of
petroleum products in above-ground tanks within three hundred feet
of any dwelling.109 (Underground tanks were limited to six hundred
gallons.) As its name implied, Pierce Oil was a petroleum distributor
whose business was located along the railroad that ran through Hope.
According to the record, Pierce had established its business at its
current site at the city’s request but the site was within three hundred
feet of a dwelling. (In fact, all potential locations in the city for
Pierce’s tanks were within three hundred feet of dwellings.) The
effect of the ordinance was to require Pierce to relocate outside of the
city limits.
Pierce sought to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance in the
Hempstead (County) Chancery Court. The city demurred to the
request, which was subsequently dismissed by the Chancery Court
judge. A unanimous Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the dismiss-
al.110 On appeal, Pierce, apparently relying upon Dobbins, maintained
that the city’s demurrer had been improperly granted. In its complaint
Pierce asserted that because of the design of its tanks and the valves
and pipes used to transfer products from railroad cars to the tanks, the
storage of petroleum products posed no threat to the rest of the
community. Moreover, it claimed that the ordinance imposed serious
108. Id. at 81-82. 
109. 248 U.S. 498 (1919). 
110. Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 127 Ark. 38 (1917).
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economic hardship on it since it would be required to locate its tanks
outside of town at considerable expense and would, for all practical
purposes, be left with a useless lease for its present site.
Consequently, it maintained that the ordinance was “arbitrary,
unnecessary, and unreasonable.” Since the city had not contested any
of these assertions, Pierce insisted, the chancery court had erred in
dismissing the request for an injunction without a hearing.111
In rejecting this argument, the Arkansas Supreme Court took
judicial notice of the fact that “disastrous explosions have occurred
for which no satisfactory explanations have ever been offered. The
unexpected happens.”112 Consequently, even if all of Pierce’s claims
could be verified, an ordinance like the one at issue would still be a
valid exercise of the police power.
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court two
years later, the matter was dismissed in a three paragraph opinion
upholding the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court.113 Holmes
emphasized that the fact that the plaintiff may have operated its plant
in a safe manner in no way limited the ability of the state to regulate,
or even ban, dangerous oils. As he put it, “[i]f it were true that the
necessarily general form of the law embraced some innocent objects,
that of itself would not be enough to invalidate it or to remove such
an object from its grasp.”114 In other words, Pierce’s only options
were to seek out a location outside of the city limits or work to get
the ordinance repealed.
The final case, St. Louis Poster Advertising Company v. City of St.
Louis involved a 1905 city ordinance which required permits for all
but the smallest billboards and imposed a large number of restrictions
on the height, size, and placement of billboards.115 In addition, it
imposed a license fee of one dollar for every five linear feet of
billboard. The appellant erected three billboards on its own property
that failed to comply with the terms of the ordinance. In response, the
111. Id. at 407. 
112. 191 S.W. at 407.
113. 248 U.S. 498. 
114. 248 U.S. at 500. 
115. 249 U.S. 269 (1919). This was actually two cases involving the same parties. One
began in state court, the other in federal. Since both reached the Supreme Court docket during
the same term, the two cases were consolidated and argued as a single case.
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city threatened to tear down the structures unless they were brought
into compliance with the ordinance.
The company filed requests for injunctions against the
enforcement of the ordinance in both state and federal court, but both
requests were dismissed upon demurrers.116 Writing for the Court,
Holmes this time dismissed the appellant’s claims in two paragraphs.
The reasonableness of billboard regulation had been resolved by
Cusack, Holmes explained, and that consistent with its right to ban
billboards altogether the city was free to impose a high tax on them.
As with Pierce Oil, the advertising company’s options were to
relocate or else work to get the law changed through the legislative
process.
III. EVALUATING THE LEGACY OF THE FULLER AND WHITE COURTS
In his argument before the Supreme Court in Eubank v.
Richmond, Richmond lawyer H. R. Pollard complimented the court
on its reasonable approach to land use regulation: “This court, in a
larger sense than any other court of the land, has taken judicial
cognizance of the everyday facts of modern complex, social and
industrial life, and has responded thereto with less apparent
reluctance than the courts of last resort of most of the States.”117
Although Pollard subsequently suffered the indignity of being the
first lawyer to lose a land use case before the Supreme Court, he was
correct that the Supreme Court had demonstrated a high degree of
acceptance of state and municipal efforts to regulate the use of land.
Although the Court in this era viewed the determination of the
reasonableness of a police power regulation as one of its responsi-
bilities, it routinely upheld the legitimacy of local land use controls.
In eleven of fourteen cases decided by the Fuller and White Courts,
challenged regulations were upheld routinely and in only one case
was there even a single dissenting vote.118 Moreover, in two of the
 
116. St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 195 S.W. 717 (1917). The
federal case is apparently unreported. 
117. 226 U.S. at 139. 
118. Two other land use cases reached the Supreme Court in the 1910s but both were
subsequently dismissed without opinion. Broussard v. Baker, 241 U.S. 639 (1916) (dismissed
for want of jurisdiction); Pacific States Supply Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 235
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three cases in which landowners prevailed, the court implied that the
regulation at question would not have been unreasonable if it was in
fact adopted out of a legitimate concern for the public welfare
(Dobbins) or had it been directly imposed by a governmental body
(Eubank). Only in Buchanan v. Warley was an ordinance found to be
an unreasonable exercise of the police power and that case involved a
blatant effort to use the police power to shield an unconstitutional act
of racial discrimination. In spite of the “pro-property” reputation of
the Supreme Court under Fuller and to a lesser extent White, the
Court proved repeatedly that it was indifferent to pecuniary losses
suffered by the landowners. Ordinarily the benefit of the doubt went
to the state, and so long as the evidence did not show that the action
was undertaken in bad faith or for a purpose that went beyond the
contemporary understanding of the police power or violated a
separate constitutional right (like the right to buy and sell property
free from state-imposed racial restrictions), the statute was presumed
legitimate.
The only further restriction appeared to be a requirement of a
more or less proportionate fit between the harm to be remedied and
the solution adopted, although there was no case in which a statute or
ordinance was found deficient for this reason, and the Court asserted
on a number of occasions that the mere fact that an ordinance might
affect those whose property uses posed no immediate danger to the
public did not threaten its validity. Even more importantly, once the
act in question was found to be a reasonable exercise of the police
power, the degree of damage to affected landowners was irrelevant.
Since the public health and safety required, or at least justified the
regulation at issue, it was no defense that the measure might have a
particularly harsh impact on an individual property owner.
While an examination of the landmark land use opinions of the
1920s is beyond the scope of this article, the decisions of the Fuller
and White Courts provide a highly informative vantage point for
evaluating those cases. Certainly, they make it clear that Justice
Holmes’ opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,119 striking down
Pennsylvania’s anti-subsidence Kohler Act, represented a real
U.S. 709 (1914) (dismissed with costs). 
119. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p+1+Hylton.doc 01/04/01
36 Festschrift [Vol. 3:1
departure from the Court’s previous land use decisions, at least to the
extent that it focused upon the extent of the diminution of “values
incident to property.” When Holmes wrote that “the general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking,”120 he was
not stating a principle relied upon in previous cases. Similarly when
he implied that the exercise of the police power in Plymouth Coal and
other cases had been warranted because they “secured an average
reciprocity of advantage”121 he was asserting a standard that the Court
had not invoked in those cases.
While the result in Mahon was not necessarily inconsistent with
the earlier cases, it seems likely that the seven justices who joined in
Holmes’ opinion probably felt that the record established that the
Kohler Act was not motivated by concerns for the public health and
safety. This was the argument advanced by Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Justice Kephart in his dissent to the opinion appealed to the
Supreme Court and by noted attorney John W. Davis who argued the
case; Holmes reached that result in a manner that seemed to be in
conflict with the spirit of the earlier cases.122 Not surprisingly, in his
dissent he argued that the statute in question fell squarely within the
bounds of the police power, Justice Brandeis cited numerous opinions
from the previous two decades including Welch v. Swasey,
Hadacheck, Pierce Oil, Laurel Hill Cemetery, Murphy v. California,
Reinman v. Little Rock, and St. Louis Poster.
On the other hand, Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty,123 upholding a comprehensive zoning
scheme against a facial challenge to its constitutionality, was
consistent with the deference shown by the Fuller and White Courts
to local governmental determinations of what constituted the public
interest. While the scope of the zoning act at issue in Euclid exceeded
anything that the court encountered in the 1900s and 1910s, only
three of the nine justices found that distinction sufficient to warrant a
 
120. 260 U.S. at 415. 
121. Id. at 415. 
122. For Kephart’s decision see Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, 507 (1922).
A summary of Davis’ argument appears at the outset of the United States Supreme Court
opinion. 
123. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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finding that the village had exceeded its authority under the police
power. Miller v. Schoene,124 with its holding that the state of Virginia
could order the destruction of infected ornamental cedar trees which
threatened the state’s apple crop, was entirely consistent with the
Fuller and White Court decisions. So too was Nectow v.
Cambridge.125 Although the court found that the zoning ordinance in
that case was unconstitutional (which it had been reluctant to do in
earlier cases), the key fact in Nectow was that a court-appointed
master had found that the classification of Nectow’s parcel did not
serve any public interest; a finding that the Court was unlikely to
make on its own, but also one that it was unlikely to ignore.
As twenty-first century courts wrestle with the question of what
the proper requirements for a legislative taking should be, they may
well benefit from a reexamination of the answers provided to
comparable questions by the United States Supreme Court at the
outset of the twentieth century.
 
124. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
125. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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